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
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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS



NUCLEAR TEST TALKS

With regard to the Geneva negotiations, the communiqué issued on 3 March at the conclusion of the Khrushchev-Mac-

millan talks made only a non-committal statement that both countries recognize the "great importance" of achieving

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agreement, toward which they will continue their efforts. In a speech on 2 March, however, Khrushchev tried to create the impression that there had been substantial progress in the discussions with Macmillan, singling out nuclear-test cessation as one of the issues on which "the British guests showed a proper understanding of our position, and on their part advanced a number of interesting points."

At Geneva the Soviet delegation continues to develop a record of appearing "reasonable," while rejecting Western proposals for an effective control system. On 2 March, while calling it a "hesitant step" in the right direction, the Soviet chief delegate rejected the Anglo-American suggestion that the proposed control commission be composed of three Western, two Soviet bloc, and two neutral states. He charged that under this scheme the two neutrals could agree between themselves to divide their votes, thus giving the West an automatic majority.

Ignoring continuing Western criticism of Soviet insistence on a comprehensive veto in the control commission, the Soviet delegate on 3 March contended that Anglo-American agreement to apply the "unanimity rule" to a number of decisions suggests that the West will ultimately agree to Moscow's position on voting on all issues. He claimed that disagreement on this question was no longer a question of "principle" but was rather one of "degree." Moscow probably believes that creating an impression of even partial agreement on this issue will weaken the Anglo-American

charge that continued Soviet insistence on the veto makes development of an effective control system impossible.

On 3 March the Soviet delegation suggested that the conference drop further discussion on such "details" of the control system as permanency of inspection groups, time schedules, and phases of inspection, about which, in the absence of actual experience, it is impossible for one side to convince the other of the value of its viewpoint. The delegates suggested that the conference concentrate instead on agreeing to "general principles," leaving the details to the control commission to develop after the organization is established and operating.

At the United Nations, Secretary General Hammarskjold has suggested that one way out of the impasse on voting procedure is to place the problem in a larger context in which each side could find balancing elements. He mentioned the possibility of allowing the veto at strictly defined stages of control operation, with the treaty providing an escape clause for the other side.

He pointed out that if one side vetoed a key action or finding of the control system, the other side would then be free to take some counteraction such as suspending inspection in its territory, conducting nuclear tests, or even withdrawing from the treaty. He thought there could be a provision for a second vote within 24 hours after a veto as a kind of right to demand reconsideration.

Hammarskjold believes all other issues, including

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nationality of inspection teams, are susceptible to solution through compromise. He personally favored a nine-nation control commission with three

members each from the West, the Communist bloc, and the "neutrals." [REDACTED]

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